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1. Statement: Increasing of embedded real-time systems responsibilities
1.1 Quantitative increasing
Embedded real-time systems are now integrated in numerous products used everyday:
transportation vehicles (aircrafts, cars, trains, etc.), communication means (phones,
switchboards, satellites, etc.), medical devices (tele-echography, pacemakers, etc.), systems
producing energy (nuclear plants, etc.), consumer goods (robots, etc.) or services (cash
dispensers, etc.).
The increasing of the number of such systems is correlated with the increasing of the number of
the services they offer. This is mainly due to the software technology which, at first, allowed the
improvement of the former functionalities replacing other technologies for implementation.
Software is now used to offer functionalities to compensate for inadequacies of the capacities of
users or other products, taking charge of new responsibilities. Finally, embedded real-time
systems are now completely integrated in global systems and cannot be considered as
independent elements. In the following sub-sections, these new characteristics and roles of
software technology included in real-time embedded systems are analysed to highlight their
consequences.
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1.2 Improvement of performance and functionalities
The increasing of software technology in real-time embedded systems is at first due to the
clients who require more reliability. Indeed, this technology is not prone to ageing. Thus, the
electronics systems embedded in cars were developed to manage the ignition of sparks. The
executed program takes into account the position of the piston deduced from the position of the
driving shaft. This substitution of a software technology for an hardware technology initially
allows the ignition system reliability to be increased: no more contact points to be changed or
tuned.
Then, the software technology was used as it allows to implement sophistic functions, that is,
functions whose behaviour is complex and adaptable to the changing of the environment
parameters values. Thus, the functional flexibility offered by the software realisation permits to
control dynamically the spark ignition depending on the values of various parameters such as
the engine temperature or speed, in order to reduce the consumption, for instance thanks to the
ignition advance. The valve opening controlled by a computer instead of a camshaft also
increased the engine capabilities (horsepower) taking the environmental characteristics (engine
temperature, etc.) into account. Therefore, the software technology improves the performance
of functionalities previously offered.
As software allows complex behaviours to be expressed, new services were offered afterwards.
The air conditioning control considering inside and outside temperatures, the adaptation of the
power steering considering the car speed, or the changing of the shock absorber laws taking
the driving style into account are three examples.
However, in all cases, these functionalities provide more comfortable cars but are not absolutely
necessary.
These new functionalities were largely distributed thanks to the low production cost but also the
relatively low development cost offered by the software technology: implementation is made
easier by compilers, prototypes can be quickly designed, etc. These characteristics associated
with the flexibility of this technology encouraged designer to imagine new products.
1.3 Take charge of shortcomings
More recently but with an increasing importance, embedded real-time systems implemented
with software technology aim at overcoming shortcomings not due to these systems but to other
elements in their environment. Thus, more and more responsibilities are transferred to these
systems.
1.3.1 Responsibilities to take charge of bad use
At first, a part of the responsibilities previously taken by users is now delegated to these
systems. In particular, the requirement of the absence of unacceptable effects due to a bad use
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of the system, is transferred from the user to the system. Hereafter, we mention some examples
coming from automotive domain.
The excessive emission is an unacceptable harm which may be due to a bad driving. Such a
situation occurs if the driver steps too much on the accelerator when the car climbs up a hill. To
handle this bad behaviour of the user, a device analyses the exhaust gas and the accelerator
cable is replaced by a numeric transmission allowing the engine control system to limit the
pollution, reducing the injected fuel despite the driver action on the accelerator. Thus, the actual
engine acceleration is not only due to the driver but partially delegated to the computerised
system.
Injuries or deaths due to accidents are a second type of harms. Their prevention is now partially
delegated to embedded real-time software applications. For instance, the ESP (Electronic Skid
Prevention) prevents skids, maintaining the car on its trajectory when a car is entering a bend
too fast. So, this system is a palliative device to a bad driving. The system which pressurises the
hydraulic braking circuit when the driver removes quickly his/her foot from the accelerator, or the
ABS avoiding the blocking of the wheels are other systems preventing accidents when car
speed is too high. The systems controlling the airbags are useful to reduce the effects of these
accidents.
1.3.2 Responsibilities to take charge of inadequacies of other technologies
Besides they have to overcome the user failures, the embedded real-time software applications
now have to take charge of unacceptable effects of the other technologies used in the product.
These effects are due to characteristics of hardware technologies such as the ageing. For
instance, the software application has to adapt its behaviour to the deteriorated states, or
sometimes the failures, of the external hardware components. For example, to respect
acceptable emission levels, embedded programs have to take into account the change of the
surrounding elements: deteriorated states of mechanical parts, of the hydraulic circuits, blocking
of valves such as the EGR (Exhaust Gaz Recirculation).
1.3.3 Responsibilities to take charge of design faults of other components
To complete this list of new responsibilities, we must mention the fact that embedded software
now has to handle design faults of surrounding elements. For instance, a car manufacturer
added an ABS with an electronic braking distributor to prevent harms for a car mechanically
unstable at braking time.
1.3.4 Responsibilities to act and to take decisions
Thus, more and more responsibilities are transferred to embedded real-time software
applications. These delegated responsibilities at first concerned the realisation of actions
decided by humans or external devices. Now, certain applications take decisions. In automotive
domain, the ABS may release the hydraulic pressure to avoid the blocking of the wheels,
despite the action of the driver on the brake pedal.
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The complete autonomy to take decision and to realise the associated action is illustrated by the
systems opening and controlling the airbags. The preservation of the directional stability of the
car is another role delegated to real-time software, previously played by the driver.
1.4 Integration
A last significant changing for embedded real-time software concerns the progressive
integration of these systems in products. Previously, these software applications were isolated,
providing specific and independent functions. Then, they were associated with other elements
of a product at first by service relationships (a master using fonctionalities offered by software
applications) and finally by cooperation relationships (exchanging data). Therefore, complex
interactions now exist with humans, mechanical devices or other real-time software applications.
Again, real-time systems embedded in cars provide numerous examples. They interact with the
driver and the environment using sensors (temperature, pressure, position of the drive shaft or
of the steering wheel, etc.) and actuators (injector or valve opening, hydraulic braking circuit,
etc.). They also interact together exchanging data on the CAN bus. For instance, the system
controlling the braking interacts with the engine control system, the power steering control
system, the absorber control system, etc., to prevent a car to skid or to overturn. Indeed, it
needs to reduce the speed, to modify the wheel direction and to harden the absorbers.
This strong coupling between an embedded real-time application and other components
increases the harms caused by a failure of this application due to the contamination effects.
2. Requirements: Assurance of absence of risk
2.1 Increase in risks to increase the benefits
As described, the embedded real-time systems now have more and more responsibilities. This
assignment aims at increasing the benefits thanks to software technology. In automotive
domain, these benefits concern the decreasing of the pollution rate, of the accident probability
or severity, and of the production costs. Everybody accepts these benefits but also has to
wonder about negative effects of the potential failures of these systems.
For instance, nowadays, the steering shaft transmits the rotation of the steering wheel to the
wheels. This shaft is at the origin of numerous sever injuries when an impact occurs. The
replacement of this mechanical device by a software program detecting the steering wheel
movement and acting on the wheels could avoid such harms. It also offers numerous other
advantages as the possibility to adapt the effect on the wheels of the orientation of the steering
wheel depending on the car speed, making easier the driving in cities. Unfortunately, we also
can imagine the harms caused by a dysfunction of such a system, particularly when the car is
running fast.
The increasing of the benefits provided by embedded real-time software also implies a harms'
severity increasing if a failure occurs.
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The harms concern the human injuries but also the trade. In particular, the confidence of the
consumers in products may decrease strongly and may court actions against firms.
2.2 Requirements for more guarantees
The increasing of the responsibilities transferred to embedded software and the complexity of
their coupling with other systems lead the citizens but also the firms, the engineers and the
authorities to wonder about the confidence they can attribute to these applications, that is about
the absence of the harms they can cause.
2.2.1 The citizens
The citizens use everyday products integrating embedded real-time software. They are
bothered by their dysfunction and are worried about the potential harms they can cause on their
health, money, etc.
Their confidence in the products realised with conventional technologies is based on a
recognised know-how of the manufacturers. For instance, a client buys a car of a given
trademark because the reliability of its engine was tested by previously produced models and
progressively improved, or because the trademark capabilities in creating new cars are well-
known. Such a situation does not exist for complex real-time software embedded in these
products and the previous experiences justify the existing suspicion (car recalls for instance).
2.2.2 The firms
Firms and engineers perceived the benefits which are provided by the software technology:
implementation of complex functionalities, reduced costs, etc. They are also aware of the harms
which can be caused by the computing systems integrating their products: physical harms to the
users and their environment but also trade harms particularly on the brand image of the firm,
and financial risks due to high penalities or damages to be paid to displeased clients.
The financial proceedings against Toyota due to a failure of an embedded real-time software
have to be studied as they provide a typical example. Coming from USA, we may imagine
similar lawsuits in Europe in the near. Beforehand, let us specify that similar issues occurred to
other/all manufacturers. However, they were generally not promoted through media. On the
contrary, the problems met by Toyota were at the origin of numerous communications.
On September 1998, the ARB (Air Resources Board) of California required of Toyota the recall
of 330 000 cars sold in California. The electronic system checking emissions (on-board
diagnostic system) may not detect a too important gas emission and so does not signal such a
situation to the driver [CEPA, 1998]. This system provides one more time an illustration of the
transfer of responsibilities previously mentioned: the exceeding rate of emission has to be
detected by a system and not by the car owner. The cost to repair was 250$ per car. Thus, the
global cost reached more than 82 millions $. This is probably one of the reasons of the Toyota
refusal to recall the cars. Moreover, the firm signalled that the involved systems received an
agreement. The case was transmitted to the court of California (Sacramento).
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In July 1999, at the US Environmental Protection Agency request, the US Department of Justice
repeats the demand at federal level [USDJ, 1999] [OLSON, 1999]. The court records that the
failure affects 2.2 millions of cars sold in USA between 1996 and 1998. It also mentions that the
failure comes from a program design fault and claims more than 58 Billions $ of civil fine for the
harms caused to the environment (pollution) and citizens. Finally, it requires the recall of the
cars. The comments of the judgement show that the court considered the transfer of
responsibilities from the driver to the software and consequently to the designer: "Companies
that take shortcuts with their vehicle pollution-control systems shortchange the consumer and
our environment. [...] We will hold them accountable" (Lois Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General
for Environmental affairs).
2.2.3 The engineers
Engineers have a quite low confidence in the software they produce. This is shown by the huge
duration spent to test their programs (often 40 to 50 % of the total development duration). This
duration is, on one hand, due to the time needed to diagnose and to correct detected faults, but
also, on the other hand, aims at increasing the assurance that they want to have on the product
behaviour correction.
The engineers are aware of the harms which can be caused to the users but also to themselves
as the user harms may have strong impacts on their careers. Indeed, the harm caused by the
system is often due to a failure of its behaviour. The fault in the program generally comes from a
human error of the engineers activities.
2.2.4 The authorities
The highlighted issues also concern the national or international authorities. They are faced with
a dilemma.
- The demand of assurance from citizens is very high as the harms caused by embedded
software failures may affect the society (pollution, health, transportation, etc.).
- The very high expenditure necessary to provide such assurance may increase the prices of
the products whereas a strong concurrency exists. Some court orders may also put a brake on
the development of embedded software technology.
Moreover, the non respect for assurance given to the citizens has an important political impact.
3. Solution: Certification
The Toyota issues show that, even if the harms due to embedded software failures affect each
person (respiratory troubles, etc.), they have to be handled by the authorities. They must
- determine the harms and their origins to start legal proceedings against the firm, but also
2nd European Congress ERTS - 7 - 21 – 22 – 23 January 2004
- prevent these harms providing a high level of guarantee to the citizens.
This guarantee is obtained by the certification of these systems. Certification is defined as
[EN4502, 1993] the procedure by which a third-party gives written assurance that a product,
process, or service conforms to specified requirement. The requirement may concern various
points of view. In this paper, they deal with safety, that is the absence of unacceptable risk
[ISO51, 1999].
The product user is the first person interested in certification as he/she is the first affected by the
harms caused by these products. Moreover, thanks to the existence of a certificate, he/she does
not have to assess him/herself the potential damages these systems can provoke.
For the firms or the designers, the certification does not only provide a trade advantage. It
provokes a transfer of a part of their responsibilities to the certification authority. One more time,
the legal proceedings against Toyota illustrate this assertion. From 1999, Toyota signals that its
failing on-board diagnosis system received a certificate from the Californian Air Resources
Board, after experiments in their laboratories. Thus, Jim Orson from Toyota headquarters said
in July 1999: "We [...] firmly believe our vehicules comply with the testing procedures as
originally written" [OLSON, 1999]. This argument was accepted by the Californian court which
decided the 24 February 2000 that the California Air Resources could not require a global recall
of the 337 000 cars concerned in California [APSA, 2000]. Implicitly, this decision considered
ARB as partially responsible of the pollution due to the oversight of their verification. At the
same period, the federal ERA (Environmental Protection Agency) required a national recall.
Finally, in California, a settlement was signed the 7 march 2002. Toyota accepted to pay 7.9
millions $ to finance projects on environment and to increase the duration of the guarantee of
their embedded systems from 3 to 14 years or from 50 000 miles to 15 000 miles. Moreover, the
court does not require the callback of the 33 000 cars specifying that ARB certified the system
but Toyota did not provided certain pieces of information useful to the certification process
[USDT, 2002] [CEPA, 2002].
An equivalent settlement occurs at the federal court on the 7 march 2003. Toyota will spent 34
millions $ including 20 millions $ to reduce the emission of 3000 public vehicles (scholar buses,
etc.) and was fined 500 000 $ [USDJ, 2003]. This amount is far from the initial 58 billions $ and
the recall of 2.2 millions of vehicles required [ARB 2003]. This moderated judgement is due to
the obtained certificate. However, it does not minimise the responsibilities of systems designers.
Indeed, the judgement also announces clearly the future consequences if these responsibilities
are not taken. Thomas L. Sansonetti of the Environment and National resources Division wrote:
"Vehicule manufacturers must make all required disclosures so that EPA [Environmental
Protection Agency] can carry out its responsibilities to ensure clean air. [...] This settlement
makes clear that we will enforce these requirements vigorously".
4. Problem handling
The transfer of responsibilities from the user to embedded real-time software applications or the
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attribution of new responsibilities to these systems, correlated with the assurance required by
users may have severe consequences.
- For the designers, these features may reduce innovation: even if the benefits of software
technology is well-known, the potential damages also exist. In particular, the use of recent
technologies such as Object-Oriented languages arouses suspicions.
- For the firms, these features may strongly increase the cost of the products to provide the
required assurance.
- For the certification authorities, these features may increase their requirements and the
duration spent to attribute a certificate, to obtain more and more guarantees. This will increase
the cost of the products and delayed their availability on the market.
To prevent these drawbacks, most of the proposed solutions
- concern separated domains (avionics, space, medical systems, transportation, etc.) whereas
the problems are generic,
- mainly study the implementation technologies whereas numerous issues concern the system
design.
The research activities started in the framework of the project "UML & Certification" aim at
- going back to the basic requirements of certification proposing a generic approach based on
risk management [IS073, 2002],
- studying the risks associated with the UML modelling technology,
- examining how the risks associated with each embedded real-time software application can be
expressed and handled using UML,
in order to provide to the user, the designer and the authorities assurance of the absence of risk
of unacceptable harms.
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